Enterprises have long treated quantum computing as a distant, theoretical risk — but that window is closing fast, and most organizations have barely begun to act on mitigating the security concerns it poses.
During Forrester’s Security & Risk Forum in Washington, D.C. this November, VP and principal analyst Sandy Carielli took a poll of attendees. When asked how they were progressing with their quantum security migrations, only 15% of the security leaders in the room said they had made measurable progress.
That small sample reflects a broader trend: many organizations are underestimating the urgency of migrating to post-quantum cryptography, as competing security priorities — particularly AI — consume budgets and executive attention.
Post-quantum cryptography refers to a set of newly standardized encryption algorithms designed to withstand attacks from quantum computers, which could eventually break the public-key cryptography that currently secures everything from online banking to VPNs to digital signatures.
Enterprises are expected to migrate their cryptographic infrastructure — including TLS, PKI, authentication systems and data-at-rest encryption — to these new standards before quantum computers capable of breaking current encryption become operational.
Experts warn that waiting until that threshold is reached could leave businesses with too little time to protect their most sensitive information.
“Until recently, organizations could credibly argue that quantum was a decades-away risk not worth prioritizing today,” Yoni Katz, lead cyber credit risk associate at Moody’s Ratings, told TechTarget. “That argument is becoming harder to make. Recent research suggests that a quantum computer capable of breaking widely used encryption could arrive much sooner than previously expected.”
The transition to quantum-resistant encryption is not a routine technology upgrade. It is a complex, multiyear security transformation involving infrastructure, application development, identity management, procurement, risk and third-party suppliers.
With government requirements tightening and major technology providers setting migration targets, analysts argue that enterprises need to start building migration strategies now, rather than waiting for a definitive date when quantum computers become a practical threat.
Quantum migration timelines moving forward
One of the most daunting obstacles to enterprise readiness has been uncertainty about when quantum computers will become capable of breaking widely used cryptographic algorithms.
However, the migration timeline is becoming increasingly compressed. Researchers predict that cryptographically relevant quantum computers could arrive sooner than previously anticipated, while regulatory guidance and technology industry commitments are creating more immediate deadlines for organizations.
Carielli, who had previously advised companies to be ready for quantum by 2030, revised her statement. “Since that time, some of those dates have rolled in pretty quickly,” she said. “In fact, a lot faster than I expected.”
Next year, the French cybersecurity agency ANSSI will no longer certify products that are not quantum-ready. In the U.S., Executive Order 14412 calls for national security systems to phase out equipment that cannot support quantum-resistant encryption by the end of 2030.
Meanwhile, major technology providers are establishing their own migration milestones. Google Cloud is targeting 2027 for migration of systems vulnerable to harvest-now-decrypt-later attacks, followed by 2028 for key integrity and authentication scenarios. Microsoft and Cloudflare have also committed to addressing migration in their environments by 2029.
The quantum organizational challenge
Carielli stated that the first steps for security teams preparing for the quantum threat should be to understand where cryptography exists across their environments, which systems depend on vulnerable algorithms and what operational changes will be necessary to replace them.
Infrastructure planning is particularly important. Enterprises may have hardware refresh cycles of three or four years, while some vendors might not deliver quantum-ready equipment until later. That mismatch could force businesses to accelerate capital expenditure or maintain vulnerable systems longer than intended.
Legacy OT and Internet of Things environments present another challenge. Some equipment cannot be easily replaced, meaning organizations will need to identify compensating controls and assess the risks posed by systems that cannot support new cryptographic standards.
Beginning that process, according to Forrester, requires a cross-functional team beyond the SOC:
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Security. Leads cryptographic discovery, data classification and assessments of cloud, application and identity security readiness.
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Infrastructure. Assesses data center, cloud, hardware and OT dependencies, including equipment that may not be easily replaced.
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Innovation and emerging technology. Monitors quantum computing developments and evaluates emerging cryptographic discovery and migration tools.
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Development. Identifies outdated cryptographic libraries, hard-coded algorithms and application dependencies that could complicate migration.
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Risk management. Assesses third-party exposure, contractual obligations and the broader supplier ecosystem.
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Procurement. Incorporates quantum-readiness requirements into RFPs and vendor selection processes.
Harvest now, decrypt later
The security threat posed by post-quantum cryptography applies not only to future threats but also to past security incidents. A common objection to accelerating migration is that cryptographically relevant quantum computers do not yet exist. Organizations may question why they should divert resources from immediate priorities such as AI security.
Carielli explained, “Attackers can harvest and siphon off information now and then hold on to it until a quantum computer exists to decrypt it.”
“The harvest now, decrypt later threat adds urgency,” added Katz.
While stolen credit card information may have limited value once the cards are canceled or expire, medical records, intellectual property, financial information and sensitive government data can remain valuable for many years.
That risk adds another layer of complexity, as organizations must assess not just the likelihood of future cryptographic compromise, but how long data must remain confidential.
Vendor readiness
Even organizations with well-developed internal migration plans remain dependent on third parties. Cloud providers, software suppliers, hardware manufacturers and managed service providers can all introduce cryptographic dependencies that affect enterprise readiness.
Carielli recommended that organizations formalize new requirements for vendors rather than accepting vague assurances. That starts with requesting a documented migration roadmap — specific milestones, completed work and outstanding dependencies — along with clarity on which cryptographic algorithms vendors currently use and where post-quantum or hybrid approaches have already been deployed.
Beyond current status, enterprises should evaluate vendors’ cryptographic agility, meaning their ability to swap algorithms efficiently if newly adopted standards are later found to have weaknesses, as well as the operational impact of migration, such as hardware changes, testing and potential downtime. Procurement teams should also ask how vendors are vetting their own supplier dependencies, and begin folding these requirements into RFPs now rather than waiting until deadlines approach.
Post-quantum cryptography is prompting a fundamental security transformation that will require significant time and resources. It will involve multiple business functions and require coordination across supplier ecosystems. But organizations that wait for the technology to arrive risk discovering that their migration journey will take considerably longer than the time they have left.
Richard Livingston is an editor for TechTarget Cybersecurity, covering news, trends and analysis. Livingston's professional background includes editorial positions in the national defense industry covering the U.S. Army Medical Department, as well as offensive and defensive cyber strategy for military and government audiences.